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Abstract 
 
Why do people comply with traffic laws and regulations? Road traffic policing tends to be 
premised on the idea that people comply when they are presented with a credible risk of 
sanction in the event of non-compliance. This contrasts with a normative account of 
compliance offered by procedural justice theory, in which compliance is encouraged by 
legitimate legal authorities. In this paper we compare these two accounts of compliance. We 
find evidence that both instrumental and normative factors explain variance in motorists’ self-
reported propensity to offend. Extending the standard procedural justice account, however, 
we also find that it is social identity – not legitimacy – that forms the ‘bridge’ linking 
procedural fairness and compliance. Fair treatment at the hands of police officers seems to 
enhance identification with the social group the police represent; in turn, identification seems 
to motivate adherence to rules (laws) governing social behavior. Our findings have 
implications not only for understandings of legal compliance, but also conceptualization of 
why procedural justice motivates such compliance, and the role of procedural justice in 
promoting social cohesion. 
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Introduction 
The well-known harms of traffic offending have triggered a range of policy developments in 
recent years. In Scotland – the focus of this study – there were 12,575 road casualties 
(injuries) in 2012, including 172 deaths and 1,959 serious injuries (Transport Scotland 2013). 
Driver behavior, particularly illegal driver behavior, is responsible for some of these 
casualties, with research suggesting speeding is a contributory factor in a significant 
proportion of accidents (Taylor et al. 2000). Year on year figures suggest that between one in 
seven and one in nine deaths on Scottish roads involve drivers exceeding the legal alcohol 
limit.1 
Perhaps more than other aspects of legal regulation, the enforcement of traffic laws is 
premised on an instrumental model of human behavior. Notwithstanding government-led 
initiatives to convince people of the wrongfulness of drink driving, at the heart of the policing 
of roads and drivers is a rational choice model of human behavior that proposes (a) that 
people are motivated to break traffic laws when they gain utility from the illegal act, for 
example, when they are in a hurry to get somewhere and (b) that they will be deterred from 
doing so when and to the extent that they believe they will be caught and punished if they do. 
Thus, the risks posed by drivers who speed, ignore red-lights or drive without due care and 
attention are thought to be mitigated by the coupling of tools that increase the risk of being 
caught, such as speed cameras, number-plate recognition devices (Wells 2008) and drink-
drive campaigns, with fines, penalty points and threats of severe punishment when people are 
caught. At the time of writing the UK government is proposing a fourfold increase to the 
maximum fine available to magistrates to punish those who break speed limits on motorways 
(up to £10,000, as reported in the Guardian, 10th June 2014). 
While the extent to which the severity of potential punishments affects people’s 
choices is open to considerable doubt (Doob and Webster 2003; Pratt et al. 2006) – thereby 
suggesting that increasing the fines available to magistrates for speeding will have little effect 
– a rational-choice perspective posits that behavior can be influenced by raising people’s 
estimates of the probability of being caught if they break the law, in some circumstances at 
least (Nagin 2013). This would indicate that developments such as speed cameras and 
roadside breath tests (Mazerolle et al. 2011) will deter potential road traffic offenders by 
increasing the perceived likelihood of punishment.  
Indeed, such policies do appear to have had significant effect, with the number of 
road deaths and overall casualties having fallen significantly in Scotland (Transport Scotland 
2013) and across the UK in recent decades, as the use of speed limits, speed cameras and 
other measures has grown (Richter et al. 2006), albeit that advances in car safety technologies 
and changing attitudes and behavior in regard to drink driving are also likely to have had an 
effect. Nevertheless, the message for traffic police appears clear: if you wish to cut traffic 
offending you need to demonstrate the ability to detect crime and catch offenders. On this 
account, road users are utility-maximisers who will be prevented from committing driving 
offences by being shown that they will be caught if they do.  
And yet, this is a message that contrasts significantly with the advice offered to police 
and policy-makers by procedural justice theory, which is premised on a quite different 
account of offending behavior. Research conducted under the banner of procedural justice has 
consistently shown that when police officers treat people with fairness, dignity and respect, 
these individuals are more likely to view police as legitimate, are more likely to say they will 
help and assist officers in the future, and are less likely to report a propensity to offend. 
People who believe that justice institutions are rightful holders of power are more likely to be 
law-abiding because they internalize the moral value that it is just to obey the law (Tyler, 
2006a, 2006b), which then has an additional motivational effect on legal compliance, above 
and beyond the more specific value about the wrongfulness of the particular act (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; Jackson et al., 2012a). In this body of work the perceived 
threat of sanction is generally found to be only weakly correlated with compliance (Murphy et 
al., 2009; Tyler & Jackson, 2014).  
                                                        
1 See: http://www.road-safety.org.uk/driving/drink-driving-and-drug-driving/ (last accessed 25/08/14). 
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What this body of work finds instead is that it is normative compliance – fostered in 
part by the experience of procedurally fair and legitimate policing – that seems to be a more 
powerful force than instrumental compliance (Tyler, 2011a, 2011b; Schulhofer et al., 2011). 
People obey the law because they feel a moral compunction to, not because they are fearful of 
getting caught and punished. In this paper we apply insights from procedural justice theory to 
road traffic policing. Our study has three main goals. The first two sit firmly within 
established aspects of the procedural justice and compliance literatures, albeit that we apply 
them in a relatively novel context. Analyzing data from a survey of motorists in Scotland – in 
which all respondents had recently been stopped by the police– we first investigate the extent 
to which perceptions of the risk of sanction predicts future intentions to commit a traffic 
offence, adjusting for beliefs about the morality of driver offending behavior. 
Second, we assess whether police procedural justice (the quality of the interpersonal 
treatment and decision-making of officers) is associated with stated propensities to comply 
with road traffic laws through the intervening influence of police legitimacy. All of the study 
participants had recently encountered traffic police, meaning we capture not variation in 
contact with the police but variation in perceptions of the friendliness, professionalism, 
fairness and communicative abilities of the officers involved in the stop. We link the 
procedural fairness demonstrated by officer treatment and decision-making to perceptions of 
police legitimacy, specifically whether the institution has a right to dictate appropriate 
behavior, and whether police act in ways that normatively justify its power, role and function. 
In turn, we assess whether legitimacy explains variation in intentions to comply with traffic 
laws. Because we adjust for people’s perception of the morality of speeding and drink 
driving, as well as the perceived chance of getting caught, the estimated statistical effect of 
legitimacy on intentions to comply will be independent of the risk of sanction and the 
morality (or immorality) of the specific act. This is important given the nature of legitimacy, 
which sits as a superordinate moral value that one should defer to authority ‘as part of the 
obligations associated with citizenship’ (Darley et al., 2002: 43), and which represents a sense 
of authorization and consent. 
Our third goal – and most theoretically innovative contribution – is to investigate the 
role of social identity in the context of a procedural justice account of compliance. Drawing 
on hitherto under-explored criminological aspects of procedural justice theory, we test a path 
from procedural justice, via specific identity judgments - as a Scottish citizen who believes it 
is important that other members of the group see them as law-abiding - to compliance. We 
also assess whether legitimacy mediates any observed association between identification and 
compliance.  
To anticipate our main findings we conclude that – as in other legal contexts –
although instrumental concerns about the risk of sanction are important, normative factors are 
stronger predictors of intentions to comply with the law. Considering the procedural justice-
compliance pathway specifically, we show it is the path from procedural justice to 
compliance via social identity that retains explanatory power when tested against the standard 
legitimacy path. While there is a strong bivariate correlation between legitimacy and traffic 
offending, once we adjust for social identification this association is broken. In this particular 
context, at least, legal compliance may thus be encouraged by police activity that strengthens 
people’s identification with the social group the police represent, and which activates forms 
of self-regulation associated with the importance of being – and being seen to be – a group 
member in good standing.  
Moving beyond the immediate context of road traffic laws, we conclude with some 
consideration not just of the theoretical and empirical place of legitimacy in procedural justice 
theory, but also the role of the police in strengthening or undermining people’s commitments 
to superordinate groups and the normative reproduction of order (funneled through the sense 
of self-worth that emanates from seeing oneself as a law-abiding member of the community). 
The paper proceeds in five parts. Parts 1 and 2 outline the hypothesized pathways 
between procedural justice, legitimacy, cooperation and compliance, and the role that social 
identity may play in this context, while part 3 describes our data and analytical techniques.  
Results are presented in part 4 with discussion and concluding comments in part 5.  
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1. Procedural justice, legitimacy and compliance 
Legitimacy exists in the eyes of citizens partly when they believe the institution has a positive 
right to dictate appropriate behavior and when they feel that they have a corresponding duty 
to obey its instructions. But legitimacy ‘in the eyes of the beholder’ – i.e. the citizen subject to 
justice institution authority – should also be seen as a response to the claim that power is 
rightfully held and exercised. The right to power exists in the eyes of citizens partly when 
they believe the institution concerned acts in ways that accord with appropriate moral values 
and conduct (Jackson et al., 2011; Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b) – that its actions are morally 
justified and appropriate to the circumstances. Legitimacy is thus present when citizens 
recognize the authority of justice institutions to dictate and enforce appropriate behavior, and 
when they believe that the power those same justice institutions wield is normatively justified 
(because authority figures act morally and lawfully).2 
At the heart of procedural justice theory is a psychological link between the way in 
which power-holders wield their authority – specifically how they treat subordinates and the 
nature of the procedures that guide their decision-making – and the way in which 
subordinates process the claims the power-holders make regarding the rightfulness of their 
power (Tyler & Huo, 2002; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). Study after study 
has suggested not only that procedural justice generates legitimacy, but that the two key 
issues affecting the generation of procedural justice are fairness of decision-making processes 
(i.e., processes that are neutral, transparent and allow voice or the active participation of all 
the involved parities) and fairness of interpersonal treatment, sometimes referred to as 
interactional justice (i.e., treatment with respect and dignity). Of particular importance is the 
idea that the exercise of authority via the application of fair process strengthens the social 
bonds between subordinates, power-holders and the wider social group. Procedural justice 
encourages not just the belief that institutions have “a just, fair, and valid basis of legal 
authority” (Papachristos et al., 2012: 417) but also identification with the group that the 
authority represents (typically assumed to be the state, where identification activates the roles 
and responsibilities associated with being a law-abiding citizen – Bradford et al. 2014).  
According to procedural justice theory, then, the way in which power-holders treat 
subordinates conveys status and identity relevant information. When treatment is fair and 
respectful, this encourages people to merge their sense of self with the wider group the 
power-holder represents. Such identification affects behaviour because people embedded in 
social groups are motivated to act in ways that satisfy the requirements of particular roles and 
relationships within the group – they draw value, worth and status from those roles and 
relationships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Conforming to the expectations of social roles enables 
people to ‘to establish and maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or 
a group’ (Kelman, 1958: 53). And, once such a process is under way, abiding by the norms 
and values attached to reciprocal-role relationships within social groups becomes important to 
people not only because they agree with the norms and values – they internalize the values of 
the group to which they feel they belong and act in ways that they find intrinsically rewarding 
– but also because they gain value and worth from the self-defining relationship with other 
group members and the group itself (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). Conforming to group 
norms and values is a way of demonstrating and reproducing group membership. On this 
account, the legitimacy of group authorities is, in part, a social norm to which group members 
are motivated to adhere (Horne 2009).  
A good deal of research supports the idea that perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
institutions of justice then play a role in normative compliance with rule and laws. A 
legitimate authority commands consent (a sense of obligation to obey) that is grounded in 
legality and moral validity (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b). Legitimacy is 
an accorded status and a normative social relation that has a motivational force. While most 
                                                        
2 This accords with the following definition of legitimacy given in the Committee to Review Research 
on Police Policy and Practice (2004: 291): ‘…the judgments that ordinary citizens make about the 
rightfulness of police conduct and the organizations that employ and supervise them.’  
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people obey most laws, most of the time, because they believe the actions prescribed in law 
are morally wrong (or have simply acquired the habit of compliance), legitimacy increases 
compliance over and above the specific moral judgment about the rightfulness of a particular 
action (and one’s perception of the risk of sanction, see Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Jackson et 
al., 2012a; Papachristos et al., 2012a; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). When citizens recognize the 
legitimacy of an institution, they believe that the institution has the right to prescribe and 
enforce appropriate behavior and they feel a corresponding duty to bring their behavior in line 
with that which is expected. Legitimacy leads to a respect for legal guidelines for action that 
dictates what behavior is appropriate and personally binding.  
 
2. Procedural justice, social identity and legal compliance 
Most of the work on procedural justice and legitimacy leaves implicit the social group that 
police fairness or unfairness can indicate membership of or exclusion from. In this paper we 
apply the procedural justice framework to a new context – traffic compliance in Scotland. But 
we also specify the social identity concerned – as membership (or otherwise) of the nation 
state and citizenship in good standing. A central objective of the current study is thus to 
examine in detail the role that social identity plays in legitimacy and legal compliance. 
There are (at least) two contrasting accounts of the place of social identity in 
procedural justice theory that – while premised on the same underlying idea and therefore not 
directly contradictory – stand in some distinction from one another. Both accounts position 
the police as a ‘proto-typical group representative’ (Sunshine and Tyler 2003) that is strongly 
symbolic of community, nation or state (Bradford et al. 2014; Reiner 2010; Loader and 
Mulcahy 2003) and thus capable of signaling to members of these social groups authoritative 
messages concerning their inclusion, status, and value within the group. Both also posit that 
people value procedurally fair policing because it contains positive identity relevant 
information – in essence it makes them feel they belong. Unfair policing, by contrast, serves 
to denigrate and exclude: a key reason why people seem to react so strongly to police activity 
they perceive to be unjust is that experiencing injustice challenges their sense of self in a quite 
fundamental manner; it indicates exclusion from superordinate groups with which most 
people strongly identify. 
The first model of procedural justice – the group value model – states that police 
procedural justice will be differentially salient to people depending on the extent of their 
identification with the group police represent; the strength of identification will affect the 
degree to which, for example, procedural justice predicts legitimacy (de Cremer and Tyler 
2005). On this account social identity is primarily prior to the experiences of authorities, and 
an important implication is that identity will moderate the link between procedural justice and 
group-related attitudes or behaviors, such as legitimacy judgments, cooperation, or 
compliance. 
By contrast, a second model of procedural justice – the group engagement model – 
stresses the ability of group representatives to actively shape the social identities of group 
members. Here, procedural justice (or injustice) at the hands of authority figures alters 
people’s social identities, with fairness strengthening (and unfairness weakening) 
identification with the group. The group engagement model therefore “assumes that 
procedures influence people’s social self by shaping their self-definition” (de Cremer and 
Tyler 2005: 162). Social identity thus mediates the link between procedural justice and group-
related attitudes or behaviors – people’s identities are not necessarily prior to their 
experiences of the behavior of group authorities but are actively influenced by such 
experiences. Here, procedural justice theory shares with symbolic interactionists (Ericson 
1975) and social identity theorists more widely (Burke and Stets 2009) the understanding that 
social identity is not fixed but fluid and open to change across the life course.  
In this paper we take the second approach to thinking about procedural justice and 
social identity. Following recent research on procedural justice and social identity in London 
(Bradford 2014) and Australia (Bradford et al. 2014) – as well as cognate approaches that 
have examined group level processes and identity formation in wider policing contexts (e.g. 
Stott et al. 2012; Blackwood et al. 2013) – we assume that policing has an active and 
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formative association with the identity judgments of people exposed to police activity (Blader 
& Tyler 2009). We proceed on the basis that procedural fairness can strengthen identification 
with the group the police represent, which in turn can motivate legitimation of group 
authorities (i.e. the police). When people identify more strongly with a group, they are 
motivated to support and legitimize its authorities, and to cooperate within it and on its behalf 
(Bradford et al., 2014). This ‘affective’ account of the importance of procedural justice 
complements a more ‘evaluative’ account, under which people use procedural justice as a 
way of assessing the normative probity of police behavior, and grant legitimacy on the basis 
that they perceive police to be ‘doing the right thing’. A recent paper investigating these 
relationships found evidence to suggest procedural justice has both an affective (mediated by 
social identity) and an evaluative (direct) association with legitimacy (Bradford et al., 2014).  
We described above the idea that the legitimacy of legal authorities can influence 
compliance with the law. Social identity may therefore have an association with compliance 
via legitimacy. Following Tyler (2009), however, we suggest here that social identity may 
directly shape such compliance. This is a notion that – of course – is a mainstay of various 
forms of labeling theory. A significant volume of research suggests ‘system contact’, such as 
involvement with the youth justice system, or experiences of stop and search, is as likely to 
result in enhanced as in diminished offending (e.g. Huizinga et al. 2003; McAra and McVie 
2007, 2012; Wiley and Esbenson 2013). The explanation offered is that such contact may 
promote ‘delinquent’ identities (that reject mainstream identification with the roles and 
responsibilities of a ‘law-abiding citizen’). The action of criminal justice agents can affect 
people’s identities – label them – in ways that do not encourage compliance with 
superordinate group norms, as the positive aspects of the group engagement model would 
suggest, but rather that turn them toward deviant, law-breaking behavior. 
The procedural justice model offers a way of further exploring why system contact 
can encourage offending (a broadly comparable alternative is Sherman’s (1993) defiance 
theory). Consider, for example, police stops. Wiley and Esbensen (2013) suggest that being 
stopped by the police not only does not deter people from offending, but may, by labeling 
them as offenders, actually increase their likelihood of committing crimes in the future. 
However, it may be that it is not the simple fact of being stopped that leads to deviancy 
amplification but, rather, the sense of unfairness that so many experience when this occurs 
(Bowling and Philips 2002). Procedural injustice signals to people that they have low status 
or do not belong to the group the police represent: this may lead not only to de-legitimation of 
the police – one path to an increased likelihood of offending – but also a turning away from 
relevant social groups and, concomitantly, a re-focusing of identity onto alternate sources of 
value and meaning, with different relationships with offending behavior; that is, affiliation 
with ‘deviant’ identities. Alternatively, exclusion from a superordinate group may generate a 
sense of anomie, and a loosening of normative restraints on behavior. 
Why might identification in turn shape compliance? Identification involves the 
transition of self-perception from individual to group, transforming goals or motives. People  
who identify more strongly will place greater weight on the outcomes for the group as a 
whole; in criminal justice contexts this implies to act lawfully is not only to act in line with 
one’s own moral values, it is also to demonstrate and develop a sense of status and self-worth 
attached to the roles and responsibilities that define shared group membership. One way of 
acting in group-serving ways is to abide by the rules and laws of the group; one acts like a 
law-abiding citizen because one identifies with the roles, duties and responsibilities attendant 
on such an identity. Analysing Afrobarometer data collected in 2000, Tyler (2009) first linked 
people beliefs about the procedural fairness of South African society and its institutions to 
superordinate identification (feeling proud to be South African, for instance), and second 
linked identification to deference to the law (getting services like electricity or water without 
paying, for example). Another possibility is that greater commitment to the group leads to 
greater aversion to behaviours that might endanger other group members – stronger social ties 
implies that the needs and wishes of others in the group become relatively more important. 
Work on procedural justice in other contexts – i.e. work organizations – has 
underlined the centrality of group identity in the way people think, and act, in social settings. 
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Such research has, moreover, linked experiences of the behavior of authority figures 
(employers or managers) via the effect these have on the identities of group members 
(employees), to cooperative or group-oriented behaviors in the workplace (Blader and Tyler 
2009; Tyler and Blader 2000; 2003). People are motivated to support and work with groups 
within which they feel valued and included, and strong identification with a social group 
leads people to internalize the values it represents: its goals become their own (Bradford et al. 
2013).   
 
An important idea underlying this discussion is that identities are inextricably linked 
to roles (Burke and Stets 2009): to identify as a member of a particular group is also to accept 
a particular set of roles. Equally, one way to be a group member, to demonstrate inclusion and 
status to self and others, is to enact these roles. We noted above that the relevant group, in the 
context of policing, can be defined as the nation-state as a community of individuals and 
social groups, of which police officers are important representatives. In as much as police 
officers treat people in a procedurally just manner, social identity theory would suggest those 
individuals are then motivated to take on the ‘role’ of citizen – they identify as citizens, and 
express and fulfill the normative expectations attendant to this role. Police can thus provide to 
people experiences that promote inclusion and define roles in line with and conducive to 
group norms and rules, or experiences that undermine such identities and diminish adherence 
to such roles. 
 
3. Study objectives 
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized pathways to compliance suggested by the discussion 
above. Hypotheses H1 to H4 concern direct predictors of compliance behaviors. H1 is that 
people who perceive a greater risk of sanction will be less ready to break road traffic laws. H2 
represents the path from police legitimacy to compliance, and, following other studies (e.g. 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Murphy et al., 2009; Jackson et al. 2012a; Tyler & Jackson, 2014), 
we hypothesize that people who grant the police more legitimacy – and therefore the right to 
mandate proper behavior – will be less likely to break the law. H3 reflects the role of personal 
(legal) morality, and suggests that those who see it as more wrong to break specific laws will 
be less likely to do so. H4 brings in the role of group membership. We expect that, 
conditioning on the other variables shown, people who identify more strongly with the group 
the police represent – that is, in this case, the ‘Scottish community’ – will be less likely to 
break the laws that govern that group. 
 Hypotheses H5 and H6 concern the role of procedural justice. Recall that all the 
individuals included in the current study had recently experienced a road traffic stop. H5 
proposes that, in line with the general predictions of the procedural justice model, those who 
felt more fairly treated by police during this stop will grant the police more legitimacy when 
subsequently surveyed. H6 suggests that fair treatment during the stop will also be associated 
with a stronger affiliation with the social identity or group represented by police. 
 Hypotheses H7 and H8 expand on the role of social identity in procedural justice 
theory. H7 proposes that independent of the association between procedural justice and 
legitimacy, individuals who identity more strongly with the group the police represent will 
grant it more legitimacy. Stated at the simplest level, we are motivated to legitimate the 
authorities of groups to which we feel we belong. H8 proposes that social identity plays a role 
in shaping personal (legal) morality. There are two reasons for suggesting this path. One the 
one hand, stronger identification with social groups may encourage internalization of group 
norms and values (of which obeying the law may be an important example). On the other 
hand, identification may strengthen subjective bonds with other group members and 
encourage adherence to rules designed to prevent harm. 
 Finally, H9 proposes what is in the current context more of a statistical control 
mechanism. Following Jackson et al. (2012a), we hypothesize that, all else equal, people who 
feel breaking the law is ‘more wrong’ will grant the police, upholders of the law, more 
legitimacy. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized pathways to compliance 
 
 
 
 
The model shown in Table 1 also suggests indirect paths. Procedural justice may 
predict legitimacy directly and indirectly through identification. In turn, identification may 
predict compliance directly and indirectly through legitimacy. Prior work has suggested that 
procedural justice enhances identification with the roles and responsibilities of the ‘law-
abiding citizen,’ in turn motivating legitimation of the police as a source of authority linked to 
nation and state (Bradford et al., 2014). This suggests that some of the association between 
identification and compliance may be mediated by legitimacy; but why might identification 
predict compliance, even after adjusting for legitimacy? The role of legitimacy relates to 
consent: one accepts the right of power-holders to expect obedience and one feels a sense of 
social, legal, or moral duty: by contrast, the role of social identity may relate to group welfare, 
and the strength of bonds between the individual and other group members. 
 
4. Data and Methods 
In this paper we use data from the Scottish Community Engagement Trial (ScotCET). Funded 
by the Scottish Government to inform their Justice Strategy for Scotland, the ScotCET 
randomized field trial aimed to replicate the Queensland Community Engagement Trial 
(QCET) (see Mazerolle et al. 2011, 2012), which tested whether the introduction of improved 
mechanisms for communicating procedural justice during routine encounters between police 
and members of the public could influence public opinion and promote legitimacy (see 
MacQueen and Bradford 2014, forthcoming). 
Like QCET, the trial focused exclusively on road policing, and vehicle stops 
conducted by the 20 road police units within Police Scotland during the Festive Road Safety 
Campaign 2013/14 (which addressed drink-driving and vehicle safety) as the ‘routine 
encounters’. The 20 road police units were divided into 10 matched pairs (‘blocks’), 
 9 
according to shared geographical and practice characteristics. Within each pair one unit was 
randomly assigned to the control group and the other to the treatment group. The control 
group conducted ‘business as usual’ traffic stops throughout the campaign period. The 
treatment group received basic training on the concept of procedural justice and how to 
successfully apply it during routine encounters with the public. This was implemented via the 
incorporation of key messages into encounters intended to communicate or enable core 
aspects of procedural justice: dignity and respect; equality; trustworthy motives; neutrality of 
decision making; clear explanation; and the opportunity for citizen participation or ‘voice’. 
Drivers were also given leaflets reinforcing these key messages. 
All drivers stopped were issued with a self-completion questionnaire with a prepaid 
envelope to return to the research team and an online alternative offered. In total 816 
completed questionnaires were returned (overall response rate - 6.6%). Some 63 per cent of 
respondents being male, and the mean age of the sample was 50.7 (SD=14.8, min=17, 
max=87).  Three quarters (75%) of respondents were home owners; 40 per cent had a 
university degree or higher, while 12 per cent reported holding no qualifications. The 
majority were employed (71 per cent), and 73 per cent were married or in a relationship.         
 
Measures 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in Mplus 7.1 was used to construct and validate 
measures of the key concepts of interest. The measures are described briefly below; Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2 show question wordings and factor loadings and a correlation matrix, 
respectively. Note that all latent variables were scored such that high equaled more (more 
legitimacy, more offending, etc.). 
Our ultimate response variable, and measure of compliance, was future traffic 
offending. This was based on two items ‘All things considered, how likely are you in the 
future to ...’ ‘break the speed limit while out driving’ and ‘jump a red light if you are in a 
hurry’, with four-point response scale ranges from 1 ‘very likely’ to 4 ‘not likely at all’. Some 
26 per cent of respondents stated they would be very or fairly likely to break the speed limit 
in the future (22 per cent stated this was not likely at all). Only 4 per cent of respondents said 
they would be very or fairly likely to jump a red light (68 per cent said not likely at all). 
We specified four main explanatory variables. The first was stop procedural justice 
(i.e. respondents’ judgments about the fairness of their recent road traffic encounter). This 
was a factor score based on six items. Respondents rated their experience of the police during 
the festive road encounter on a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘yes, completely’ to 
4 ‘no, not at all’, evaluating separately whether police were: approachable and friendly; 
helpful; respectful; professional; fair; and clear in explaining why the respondent had been 
stopped.  
Police legitimacy - Factor score based on six items tapping into felt moral obligation 
to obey the police and moral alignment between oneself and the police, measured on a five-
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 ‘disagree completely to 5 ‘agree completely’. Felt 
obligation to obey and moral alignment have been found to be distinct yet related components 
of legitimacy (Jackson et al. 2012a, 2012b; in 27 countries across Europe and beyond, see 
Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b). In this study we combine into one legitimacy measure to avoid 
multicollinearity within the SEM (see also Papachristos et al., 2012; Jackson et al., 2013). 
Social identity - Factor score based on four items measuring on a four-point Likert-
type scale various aspects of Scottish identity: ‘I see myself as a member of the Scottish 
community’; ‘It is important to me that others see me as a member of the Scottish 
community’; ‘I see myself as an honest, law abiding citizen’; and ‘It is important to me that 
others see me as an honest, law-abiding citizen’. This is therefore a measure of just one aspect 
of people’s identities, which relates to a social group the police in Scotland can plausibly be 
said to represent – the community of law-abiding, Scottish, citizens. 
  Risk of sanction - Factor score based on respondents perceptions of highly likely 
they were to be caught when breaking the speed limit and when jumping a red light, using a 
four-point scale ranging from 1’ very likely’ to 4’ not at all likely’.  
Personal morality with regard to traffic offences was measured by a factor score 
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based on respondents’ assessments (on a four-point scale ranging from 1 ’very’ to 4 ‘not at 
all’) of how wrong it is to jump a red-light and to break the speed limit. Compliance is likely 
to be based in an important sense of morality in relation to the law.   
Finally, we also added a measure of trust in police effectiveness to the model, a factor 
score based on six items measuring confidence in the police to: prevent crime, respond 
quickly to calls from the public; deal with incident as they occur; solve crime; catch 
criminals; and keep people safe. Reponses were recorded on a four-point scale ranging from  
1 ‘very confident’ to 4 ‘not confident at all’. The extent to which beliefs about the 
effectiveness of the police predict perceived risk of sanction is an important policy question, 
albeit one that is tangential to our purposes here. 
5. Results 
Figure 2 shows results from the SEM that allowed simultaneous testing of all our research 
hypotheses. Taking each part of the model in turn, we find that, first, stop procedural justice 
had statistically significant and substantively moderate to strong associations with both 
‘citizen’ identity and legitimacy. Stop procedural justice is also strongly correlated with trust 
in police effectiveness. Recall that the procedural justice questions relate to the specific 
encounter covered by the ScotCET survey. The effectiveness measure, however, relates to the 
police ‘in Scotland’. One way to interpret this regression path is therefore that people use the 
experience of police behavior during encounters as a heuristic for making judgments about 
how effective the police are in a general sense. There are, of course, likely to be important 
feedback loops here – the extent to which people trust the police in a general sense is likely to 
influence how they experience specific encounters – but, given this survey context wherein all 
respondents had recent contact with police, it seems justifiable to specify the relationship 
between a specific judgment about police activity (stop procedural justice) and a general 
measure (trust in police effectiveness) in this manner. 
Second, conditioning on procedural justice, the identity measure had an independent 
statistical effect on legitimacy that was moderately large in magnitude. The indirect statistical 
effect of procedural justice on legitimacy, via citizen identity, was significant (ß = .10; p < 
.0005). Trust in police effectiveness was also strongly correlated with legitimacy (the indirect 
statistical effect of stop procedural justice on legitimacy, via effectiveness, was also 
significant; ß = .20; p < .0005). Note however that the path from personal morality to 
legitimacy was not significant in the model. 
Third, conditioning on the other variables in the model there was a strongly 
significant association between social identity and personal legal morality. People who 
identified more strongly as ‘Scottish citizens’ tended to believe it was more wrong to break 
traffic laws than those who identified less strongly. 
Fourth the most important predictor of traffic offending was, perhaps not 
surprisingly, personal morality. Respondents who thought it was wrong to commit traffic 
offences were less likely to say they would do so in the future. Fifth, conditioning on this 
association, there was a significant, moderately strong path from identity to offending – with 
stronger identifiers feeling they would be less likely to commit traffic offences in the future. 
The indirect path from social identity of offending was also significant (ß = -.08; p < .0005), 
and the total effect was ß = -.33 (p < .0005). 
Sixth, and perhaps most interestingly, conditioning on the other variables in the 
model there was no significant association between police legitimacy and offending. 
Appendix Table 2 shows there was a relatively strong pairwise correlation between 
legitimacy and offending, and this persisted in multivariate models that excluded the social 
identity variable (results obtainable from the lead author); it was only on addition of social 
identity that the link between legitimacy and compliance was broken. 
Finally, perceived risk of sanction also predicted self-assessed propensity to commit 
traffic offences. Respondents who thought it more likely they would be caught if they 
committed an offence were, on average, less likely say they would commit such an offence in 
the future. 
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Figure 2: SEM predicting self-assessed propensity to comply with traffic laws  
 
 
 
 
 Note also the R2 values of some of the endogenous latent variables. Strikingly, for the 
offending measure R2 = .54; over half of the variation in self-reported propensity to offend 
was explained by, primarily, personal morality, risk, and social identity (as defined). For 
legitimacy R2 = .66, with variation in procedural justice, police effectiveness and citizen 
identity all making a contribution to explaining variation in police legitimacy. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
As envisaged by our research hypotheses, the experience of procedural justice during 
encounter with officers appeared to enhance perceptions of police legitimacy. In line with 
other recent studies in this area (Bradford 2014; Bradford et al. 2014), the experience of 
procedural justice was also associated with stronger identification with the group the police 
represent. Moreover, group identification did indeed appear to mediate some of the 
association between procedural justice and police legitimacy. As proposed by group 
engagement models of procedural justice, it seems that the experience of fairness at the hands 
of the police, an authority of the group, not only enhances identification with the group but 
also, partly because of this, motivates legitimation of the authority concerned.  
 Concerning the measure of offending, as predicted people who perceived a greater 
risk of sanction said they were less likely to say they would commit traffic offences, as did 
respondents who identified more strongly as ‘upstanding’ Scottish citizens and, most 
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importantly, those who believed it was wrong to break the laws concerned. However, there 
was no independent statistical effect of legitimacy on self-assessed propensity to offend. Our 
findings therefore support the idea that there are both instrumental and norms-based 
‘pathways’ to compliance with traffic laws. Importantly for police, demonstrating that 
offending carries a risk and treating people with fairness and respect may bring a return in 
terms of increased compliance with traffic offences (the total indirect effect of stop 
procedural justice on compliance was ß = -.11, p = .001). Yet, we find, unlike other studies, 
that in our data it is social identity, not legitimacy, which forms the ‘bridge’ linking 
procedural justice and compliance. 
 
Implications 
In as much as they highlight the role of social identity in predicting compliance related 
behavior, the findings described above suggest there is an important pathway from procedural 
justice to compliance that, in a sense, bypasses the issue of legality (police legitimacy has 
been linked to compliance because it is thought legitimation of legal authorities encourages 
internalization of the idea that it is right to obey the law because it is the law). Indeed the 
legality of behaviors on the road is, arguably, not often uppermost in driver’s minds; many do 
not regard minor traffic offences as crimes at all (Blincoe et al. 2006), which may complicate 
the link between police legitimacy and compliance in such situations. One interpretation of 
our results, however, is that people don’t abide by traffic regulations because they are laws, 
but because the activities proscribed are potentially harmful to others, and their sense of the 
importance of avoiding harm to others is enhanced when their identification with 
superordinate groups is activated – hence, when identification with the ‘Scottish’ community 
increases, propensity to engage in activities that might harm others in this group diminishes. 
This may partly explain the absence of a link between police legitimacy and compliance with 
traffic laws once social identity is taken into account.  
 Research on the behavior of drivers seems to support the idea that people’s 
relationships with others are indeed important, as well as suggesting another reason why 
social identity may be linked to compliance in this context. The traffic system has been 
defined as a social environment in which drivers interact and influence each other’s driving 
decisions (Haglund and Åberg 2000). Studies concerned with why people speed, for example, 
have found that they base their decisions partly on what they perceive others to be doing – 
when they think other drivers are complying with speed limits, they are more likely to do so 
themselves (Åberg et al. 1997). People are also more likely to comply with traffic laws when 
they think others in their immediate social environment – other road users – will think badly 
of them if they break those laws (Haglund and Åberg 2000, Åberg et al. 1997). It may be that 
activation of social ties, via positive identification with a superordinate social group, enhances 
the subjective importance of the views of others, and encourages self-regulatory behavior, as 
well as willingness to regulate or address the actions of others, because the individual feels 
‘closer’, more connected, to others in their environment (Anderson and Ormston 2010, 
Anderson and Dobbie 2008); this may be another reason why we find a relatively strong 
association between social identity and views on the morality of traffic offending in our 
model. 
 Our findings also have implications beyond the immediate realm of road traffic 
policing. Police activity, seen in the light of the analysis presented above, can be a provider of 
social glue (or solvent) that strengthens (or weakens) people’s social ties and their readiness 
to behave in a pro-social ways. Various strands of research have suggested that trust in the 
police and/or police legitimacy may be one factor that strengthens, indeed enables the 
development of, collective efficacy in local areas (Silver and Miller 2004; Wells et al. 2006; 
Kochel 2012). In as much as police activity fosters a stronger community orientation among 
citizens, this may encourage social trust, strengthen social networks, and enable shared norms 
that combine to enhance the overall ‘social capital’ of a community (Paterson 2002), which, 
combined with an increased propensity to draw on the police as additional means of 
regulation, builds greater collective efficacy and resilience (communities where residents can 
draw on police resources are better able to regulate themselves than those that, for whatever 
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reason, feel they cannot or should not cooperate or work with police). The evidence presented 
here may provide a further way of conceptualizing the links between trust in the police and 
collective efficacy, since it suggests that in as much as it strengthens people’s social identities 
(of the type described above) procedurally just policing will encourage people not only to 
cooperate with police, or avoid breaking the law, but to take more account of others around 
them and moderate their behavior to avoid harm. On this account, police behavior can not 
only promote self-regulation in the future, but also strengthen people’s affective links with 
others who are not police but with whom they feel they share social group membership. 
The kind of social identification that procedurally fair policing seems to encourage 
may thus have wider implications than previously thought. It may not just strengthen the links 
between police and community; it may also strengthen links within the community by 
activating social identities (‘law-abiding Scottish citizen’) that almost all people can share. 
On the other hand, of course, the implication is that procedurally unfair policing promotes not 
just division between police and community but also division within the community, via the 
generation of more exclusionary social identities as people turn away from the group the 
police represent, or perhaps social atomization and a general weakening of social ties.  
 
Limitations of this study 
As well as the normal limitations of a study of this kind – such as the use of cross-sectional 
‘snap-shot’ survey data and measurement of attitudes and intentions rather than behaviors – it 
must be remembered that the analysis draws upon a sample that probably exhibits relatively 
strong levels of community membership or ‘embeddedness’ (evidenced, perhaps, by their 
willingness to participate in the survey). Socially embedded individuals typically are 
community oriented in their beliefs and actions, with a propensity to believe in, and 
contribute to the development of, social cohesion (Paterson 2002).  However, levels of 
embeddedness are known to vary according to factors such as age, education level and 
deprivation (at household and area level). Thus, the relationships discussed here could stand 
to be tested further on a sample that was less skewed towards older, more affluent 
respondents.  In the same vein, Scotland is a country with high levels of social cohesion 
overall (ibid.). Support for, and trust in, institutions and authorities to intervene to address 
social and economic problems is also high (Curtice and Ormston 2012, Anderson and 
Ormston 2010, Anderson and Dobbie 2008, Paterson, Bechofer and McCrone 2004). 
Replication of the model presented here in other contexts is needed to draw firmer 
conclusions.     
 We should also underline that our ultimate response variable represented intentions to 
infringe traffic regulations, rather than actual illegal behaviors. While intentions to offend 
have been used in many studies as proxies for illegal behaviors, this approach is not without 
its critics (Lyn Exum and Bouffard 2012). Correlations between intentions and real world 
behaviors, while identified in many studies (ibid.), may be context dependent, and particularly 
problematic in criminal justice settings. With this in mind, the results described above should 
be interpreted with some caution. 
 
Rethinking the place of legitimacy in procedural justice theory? 
We close with two final thoughts. First, from a policy perspective, the findings presented here 
both support and go beyond current approaches to preventing traffic offending. The drivers in 
our sample were indeed ‘in-tune’ to the risk of sanction, and were less likely to report a 
propensity of offend if they thought the risk of sanction was high. To this extent, a sanction-
lead road-policing regime appears an effective way to proceed. Yet, procedural justice during 
routine road policing encounters also predicted compliance, suggesting a need to consider 
normative compliance even in an area that might be considered as dominated by instrumental 
concerns. In short, as in so many other areas of policing, the relationship between officer and 
citizen, and the way in which the former deals with the latter, can have important down-
stream implications. 
 Second, from a theoretical perspective a particularly striking implication of our 
findings is that, given the central place of social identity in procedural justice theory, and the 
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empirical correlation between social identity and legitimacy, models that show legitimacy 
predicting compliance may actually be picking up the effect of social identity. Absent social 
identity, legitimacy was associated with compliance in the ‘normal’ manner (see the 
correlation matrix in the Appendix). Yet, upon the introduction of social identity this link was 
broken. While more work is needed on this question, it may be that social identity plays an 
even more important role in procedural justice theory than hitherto suspected. 
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Appendix table 1: Measurement model for SEM shown in Figure 2 
 
  
 Standardized Factor Loadings 
Traffic offending 
 Break the speed limit while out driving 0.73 
Jump a red light if you are in a hurry 0.63 
  Risk of sanction 
 Breaking the speed limit while out driving 0.90 
Jumping a red light 0.80 
  Morality of offences 
 Breaking the speed limit while out driving 0.88 
Jumping a red light 0.79 
  Procedural justice during traffic stop 
 Approachable and friendly 0.92 
Helpful  0.90 
Respectful 0.97 
Professional 0.95 
Fair 0.94 
Clear in explaining why you had been stopped 0.68 
  Trust in police effectiveness 
 Prevent crime 0.87 
Respond quickly to appropriate calls from the public 0.83 
Deal with incidents as they occur 0.88 
Solve crimes 0.95 
Catch criminals 0.96 
Keep people safe 0.89 
  Social identity 
 I see myself as a member of the Scottish community 0.72 
It is important to me that others see me as a member of the Scottish community 0.73 
I see myself as an honest, law abiding citizen 0.82 
It is important to me that others see me as an honest, law-abiding citizen 0.86 
  Police legitimacy 
 I feel a moral obligation to obey the police 0.69 
I feel a moral duty to support the decisions of police officers, even if I disagree with them 0.62 
I feel a moral duty to obey the instructions of police officers, even when I don’t understand the 
reasons behind them 0.62 
The police have the same sense of right and wrong as me 0.80 
The police stand up for values that are important for people like me 0.88 
I support the way the police usually act 0.88 
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Appendix table 1: Correlations between latent variables 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Traffic offending (1) 1 
      Risk of sanction (2) -0.31 1 
     Personal morality (3) -0.66 0.43 1 
    Stop procedural justice (4) -0.27 0.23 0.48 1 
   Trust in police effectiveness (5) -0.36 0.22 0.43 0.62 1 
  Social identity (6) -0.40 0.20 0.40 0.33 0.35 1 
 Police legitimacy (7) -0.35 0.20 0.46 0.64 0.66 0.46 1 
 
